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Calendar No. 477
116th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 116-233
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2021
_______
June 17, 2020.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Rubio, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 3905]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 3905) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2021 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annexes to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on February 11,
2020, that the request for the National Intelligence Program
(NIP) for Fiscal Year 2021 was $61.9 billion. Other than for
limited unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of
public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 (the ``Act'') that was reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2021.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2021 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence community management account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year
2021.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2021.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 303. Clarification of authorities and responsibilities of
National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security
Section 303 permits the National Manager for National
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security,
as designated by National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42), to
delegate NSD-42 authorities to a Deputy National Manager,
without further delegation. Section 303 further reinforces the
National Security Agency's (NSA's) mission regarding
authorities and funding programs by ensuring that the National
Manager--when carrying out NSD-42 authorities--may supervise,
oversee, or execute (directly or indirectly) the Information
Systems Security Program (ISSP), but shall not supervise,
oversee, or execute any aspect of the National Intelligence
Program (NIP) or Military Intelligence Program (MIP), except as
necessary to supervise, oversee, or execute the ISSP. Section
303 also provides that, upon such delegation of authority, the
Deputy National Manager may supervise, oversee, or execute
(directly or indirectly) the ISSP, but shall not supervise,
oversee, or execute any aspect of the NIP or MIP, except as
necessary to supervise, oversee, or execute the ISSP.
Section 304. Continuity of operations plans for certain elements of the
intelligence community in the case of a national emergency
Section 304 requires the Directors of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), NSA, and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) to establish continuity of operations
plans for use in the case of certain national emergencies as
defined in statute, and share those with the congressional
intelligence committees within 7 days of a national emergency
being declared. Furthermore, Section 304 requires these
agencies to provide the committees with any updates to those
plans as the conditions of the national emergency require.
Section 305. Application of Executive Schedule level III to positions
of Director of National Security Agency and Director of
National Reconnaissance Office
Section 305 provides that the Director of the NRO and the
Director of the NSA shall be designated as Level III on the
Executive Schedule, the equivalent of an Under Secretary. The
Committee recognizes that this provision does not affect the
current Director of the NSA's military rank or pay. Section 305
is intended to provide the Committee's view as to the
Director's stature in the interagency; it is not intended to
signal support for a civilian nominee. The Committee further
clarifies that this provision shall apply to a successor
civilian occupying the position of Director of the NRO.
Section 306. National Intelligence University
Section 306 provides the National Intelligence University
(NIU) with the authorities that the Department of Defense War
Colleges have regarding faculty member hiring and compensation,
and the acceptance of faculty research grants. Section 306 also
sustains an independent, external board of visitors to provide
oversight of the NIU.
Section 307. Requiring facilitation of establishment of Social Media
Data and Threat Analysis Center
Section 307 provides a requirement regarding Section 5323
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
by requiring that the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis
Center be established not later than 180 days after enhancement
of this Act.
Section 308. Data collection on attrition in intelligence community
Section 308 requires the DNI to set standards and issue an
annual report on the reasons why different categories of
Intelligence Community (IC) employees separate from service or
applicants to IC positions withdraw from the hiring process
after they have been issued a conditional offer of employment.
Data on workforce attrition should include demographics,
specialties, and length of service. Such reasons may include an
alternative job opportunity, a loss of interest in joining the
IC, or the length of time to complete the clearance process.
Section 309. Limitation on delegation of responsibility for program
management of information-sharing environment
Section 309 stipulates that the President must delegate
responsibilities under Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to an official
other than the ODNI on or after October 1, 2020.
Section 310. Improvements to provisions relating to intelligence
community information technology environment
Section 310 streamlines current reporting requirements by
requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
develop and maintain a long-term roadmap for the Intelligence
Community Information Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section
310 further requires the DNI to develop and maintain a business
plan to implement the long-term IC ITE roadmap.
Section 311. Requirements and authorities for Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency to improve education in science,
technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics
Section 311 ensures that the Director of the CIA has the
legal authorities required to improve the skills in science,
technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (known as STEAM)
necessary to meet long-term national security needs.
SUBTITLE B--INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Section 321. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity
as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and
contractors in the intelligence community
Section 321 adds to prohibited personnel practices a
knowing, willful or negligent disclosure that reveals an IC
Whistleblower's identifying information without consent.
Section 321 further provides an IC Whistleblower with a private
right of action if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal
against the IC Whistleblower for bringing a complaint.
Section 322. Clarification of standards regarding whistleblower
complaints and information of urgent concern received by
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 322 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern''
regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) has
authority over determining whether a matter falls within the
``urgent concern'' definition.
Section 323. Clarification regarding submittal of complaints and
information by whistleblowers in the intelligence community to
Congress
Section 323 clarifies that IC Whistleblowers can give their
complaints to the intelligence committees--as long as the
complaint is provided to both Chairman and Vice Chairman or
Ranking Member or designated nonpartisan staff--regardless of
whether they are determined to be urgent concerns. Section 323
further provides new security protocols in the instances where
complaints include classified information.
Section 324. Limitation on sharing of intelligence community
whistleblower complaints with persons named in such complaints
Section 324 prohibits Federal government agents and
employees from sharing an IC Whistleblower complaint that has
been submitted to an IC element's IG with a named subject of
the complaint, unless the IC Whistleblower provides written
consent or information sharing is required as part of the
investigation. Section 324 further provides that any violation
is subject to criminal fines and/or two-year imprisonment and
requires notification to the congressional intelligence
committees.
SUBTITLE C--REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS PERTAINING TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
Section 331. Assessment by the Comptroller General of the United States
on efforts of the Intelligence Community and the Department of
Defense to identify and mitigate risks posed to the
Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense by the use
of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the
People's Republic of China
Section 331 directs the Comptroller General to assess
efforts in the IC and Department of Defense (DoD) to identify
and mitigate the risks posed to the IC and DoD by direct-to-
consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People's
Republic of China. Section 331 further requires the report to
include key national security risks and vulnerabilities, an
assessment of the IC's and DoD's identification and mitigation
of such risks and vulnerabilities, and recommendations for the
IC and DoD to improve identification and mitigation of such
risks and vulnerabilities.
Section 332. Report on use by intelligence community of hiring
flexibilities and expedited human resources practices to assure
quality and diversity in the workforce of the intelligence
community
Section 332 requires the DNI to submit a report describing
how IC elements are exercising hiring flexibilities and
expedited human resources practices afforded under 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 3326 and related regulations, including the identification
of any obstacles encountered by the IC in exercising such
authorities.
Section 333. Report on signals intelligence priorities and requirements
Section 333 requires the DNI to submit a report detailing
signals intelligence priorities and requirements subject to
Presidential Policy Directive-28 that stipulates ``why,
whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals
intelligence activities.'' This report shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Section 334. Assessment of demand for student loan repayment program
benefit
Section 334 requires the head of each IC element to
calculate the number of personnel who qualify for a student
loan repayment program benefit, and compare it to the number of
personnel who apply for such a benefit. The information
provided will include recommendations for how to optimize
participation and enhance the effectiveness of the benefit as a
retention tool, to identify any shortfall in funds or
authorities needed to provide such benefit, and to include such
materials with the budget request for Fiscal Year 2022.
Section 335. Assessment of intelligence community demand for child care
Section 335 requires the DNI in coordination with the heads
of other IC elements to provide a report that includes: a
calculation of the total annual demand for child care by
employees at NSA, NGA, DIA, NRO, CIA, and ODNI; an
identification of any shortfalls between demand and the child
care support by these IC elements; an assessment of options for
addressing any such shortfall; an identification of the
advantages, disadvantages, security requirements, and costs
associated with each option; a plan to meet, within five years
after the date of the report, the demand for childcare, and an
assessment of specific considerations that impact the
alternatives available to these IC elements.
Section 336. Open source intelligence strategies and plans for the
intelligence community
Section 336 requires the DNI in coordination with the heads
of each IC element, to conduct a survey of the open source
intelligence requirements, goals, investments, and capabilities
for each element of the IC and to evaluate the usability of the
Open Source Enterprise (OSE). Based on such findings, it
further mandates the DNI shall develop, in coordination with
the heads of each IC element, a strategy for open source
intelligence collection, analysis, and production across the
IC; create a plan for improving usability of the OSE; and
conduct a risk and benefit analysis of creating an independent
open source center.
Using the findings above, Section 336 further requires the
DNI to develop a plan for a centralized data repository of open
source intelligence. Finally, it mandates the DNI develop a
cost-sharing model that leverages the open source intelligence
investments of each IC element for the beneficial use of the
entire IC. It also requires the heads of ODNI, CIA, DIA, NGA,
and NSA to jointly brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the progress developing the aforementioned plans.
Section 337. Plan for establishing an element of the intelligence
community within the United States Space Force
Section 337 requires the DNI and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations,
to submit a plan for establishing an element of the IC within
the United States Space Force.
TITLE IV--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE
Section 401. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security
clearance procedures, and right to appeal
Section 401 requires the Executive Branch to publish
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to access
classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive
basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in order
to increase transparency and accountability, and ensure due
process. Section 401 further codifies the right of government
employees to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to
an agency-level panel. Section 401 also creates a higher level
review by a government-wide appeals panel, chaired by the DNI
as the government's Security Executive Agent, to review certain
agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of
constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led panel
can remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation
if the panel finds valid cause.
Section 402. Establishing process parity for security clearance
revocations
Section 402 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse
security clearance or access determination against a
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's
disclosure. Section 402 establishes parity in the legal
standards applied to IC Whistleblower matters.
Section 403. Federal policy on sharing of derogatory information
pertaining to contractor employees in the trusted workforce
Section 403 requires the DNI to issue a policy within 180
days of enactment that facilitates sharing of derogatory
information the government obtains on cleared contractors
(along with any mitigation measures put in place) with Federal
contractor employers' chief security officers, to help
companies maintain robust insider threat programs. The policy
must comport with privacy rights, allow individuals to verify
the information, and stipulate that such sharing is only for
purposes of security risk mitigation.
TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Section 501. Secure and trusted technology
Section 501 establishes a Communications Technology
Security and Innovation Fund to support the development and
deployment of open standards-based compatible, interoperable
equipment for fifth-generation wireless networks to create a
more secure and diverse telecommunications vendor market. It
also establishes a Multilateral Telecommunications Security
Fund to support the adoption of secure and trusted
communications technologies in key markets globally. Section
501 authorizes up to $750,000,000 for each fund and requires
the administrators of each fund to provide annual reports to
Congress detailing the use of proceeds.
Section 501 further requires the DNI to submit a report on
political influence by adversarial nations within international
forums that set standards for fifth-generation and future
generations of wireless networks, including International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), Inter-American Telecommunication
Commission (CITEL), and 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP). Section 501 also requires the DNI and Secretary of
Defense to jointly submit a report on developing federal
wireless network testbeds for development of fifth-generation
technologies for U.S. military and dual-use applications using
open interface standards-based compatible, interoperable
equipment. This report should include an assessment of efforts
by foreign governments to build wireless network testbeds for
virtualized telecommunication technologies. Both reports shall
be in unclassified form with a classified annex, if required.
Section 502. Report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build
telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services
for, or to provide such equipment and services to, certain
allies of the United States
Section 502 requires the CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit to the
congressional intelligence and armed services committees a
joint report that describes the United States intelligence
sharing and military posture in Five Eyes countries that
currently have or intend to use adversary telecommunications or
cybersecurity equipment, especially as provided by China or
Russia, with a description of potential vulnerabilities of that
information and assessment of mitigation options.
Section 503. Report on threats posed by use by foreign governments and
entities of commercially available cyber intrusion and
surveillance technology
Section 503 requires the DNI to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees on the threats posed by
foreign governments and foreign entities using and
appropriating commercially available cyber intrusion and other
surveillance technology.
Section 504. Reports on recommendation of the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission
Section 504 requires the ODNI, Department of Homeland
Security (acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis), Department of Energy
(acting through the Director of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy), Department of
Commerce, and DoD to report to Congress their assessment of the
recommendations submitted by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission
pursuant to Section 1652(j) of the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019, and to
describe actions that each agency expects to take to implement
these recommendations.
Section 505. Assessment of critical technology trends relating to
artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and
related supply chains
Section 505 requires the DNI to complete an assessment of
export controls related to artificial intelligence (AI),
microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment, and other AI-
enabled technologies, including the identification of
opportunities for further cooperation with international
partners.
Section 506. Duty to report counterintelligence threats to campaigns
Section 506 requires that Federal presidential campaigns
must report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within
one week any offers to contribute, donate, expend, disburse, or
solicit as prohibited under 50 U.S.C. Sec. 30121 by the
following individuals: a foreign principal as defined in the
Foreign Agent Registration Act; a person acting at the
direction of a foreign principal; or a person included in the
list of specially designated nationals or blocked person by the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control. Section
506 further requires Federal campaigns to establish a policy to
retain and preserve records related to reportable foreign
contacts for not less than three years, and enacts criminal
penalties for willful violations of this section.
Section 507. Combating Chinese influence operations in the United
States and strengthening civil liberties protections
Section 507 provides additional requirements to annual
reports in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3237(B) on Influence Operations and
Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) by mandating an identification of influence operations by
the CCP against the science and technology sector in the United
States. Section 507 also requires the FBI to create a plan, in
consultation with stakeholders outside the Intelligence
Community to increase public awareness and detection of
influence activities by the CCP. Finally, Section 507 requires
the FBI, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Rights and the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties
Officer of the Department of Justice, to develop
recommendations to strengthen relationships with communities
targeted by the CCP and to build trust with such communities
through local and regional grassroots outreach.
Section 508. Annual report on corrupt activities of senior officials of
the Chinese Communist Party
Section 508 requires the CIA, in coordination with the
Department of Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
and the FBI, to submit to designated congressional committees
annually through 2025 a report that describes and assesses the
wealth and corruption of senior officials of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), as well as targeted financial measures,
including potential targets for sanctions designation. Section
508 further expresses the Sense of Congress that the United
States should undertake every effort and pursue every
opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit practices of
senior officials of the CCP, including President Xi Jinping.
Section 509. Report on corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern
European oligarchs
Section 509 requires the CIA, in coordination with the
Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis and the FBI, to submit to designated congressional
committees and the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy, a report that describes the corruption and corrupt
or illegal activities among Russian and other Eastern European
oligarchs who support the Russian government and Russian
President Vladimir Putin, and the impact of those activities on
the economy and citizens of Russia. Section 509 further
requires the CIA, in coordination with the Department of
Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, to describe
potential sanctions that could be imposed for such activities.
Section 510. Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the
Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's
Republic of China
Section 510 requires the DNI to submit to the designated
congressional committees a report identifying whether and how
CCP officials and the Government of the People's Republic of
China may have sought to suppress or exploit for national
advantage information regarding the novel coronavirus pandemic,
including specific related assessments. Section 510 further
provides that the report shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may have a classified annex.
Section 511. Report on effect of lifting of United Nations arms embargo
on Islamic Republic of Iran
Section 511 requires the DIA to submit to designated
congressional committees a report on the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran's plans to acquire military arms if
the United Nations Security Council's resolutions' ban on arms
transfers to or from the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran is lifted, as well as the effects such arms acquisitions
may have on regional security and stability.
Section 512. Report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear
nonproliferation
Section 512 directs the DNI to submit a report on any
relevant activities relating to nuclear weapons research and
development by the Islamic Republic of Iran and any relevant
efforts to afford or deny international access to related
facilities in accordance with international non-proliferation
agreements.
Section 513. Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation
Section 513 expresses the sense of Congress that the Third
Option Foundation's work on behalf of the CIA's special
operations community and their families is invaluable, such
that the Director of the CIA should work with the Foundation to
implement section 6412 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019, and 2020, which provided special rules for certain
monthly workers' compensation payments and other payments to
CIA personnel.
Committee Comments
Equitable Treatment of Relocation Costs for Intelligence Community
Civilians
As demonstrated in The Intelligence Community Workforce
Agility Protection Act of 2020, S. 3675, introduced by Senators
Burr and Warner, the Committee strongly supports IC personnel
who must make a permanent change of station to accept an IC
position. The Committee recognizes such relocations pose
significant financial hardships for the IC civilians who move
their families to serve their country. Current law provides
military members with exemptions from effective tax penalties
for such relocations, but IC civilians have no similar
exemptions, thus undermining the IC's ability to recruit and
maintain a highly qualified and motivated workforce. The
Intelligence Community Workforce Agility Protection Act of 2020
would provide equitable tax treatment for IC civilians who are
subject to similar permanent change of station orders. The
Committee looks forward to expeditious congressional action on
this matter.
Advanced Aerial Threats
The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified
Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval
Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting on
unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to
adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to
U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee
remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive
process within the Federal Government for collecting and
analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena,
despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that
the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the
Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination
across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, and
this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other
agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider
relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and
armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena
(also known as ``anomalous aerial vehicles''), including
observed airborne objects that have not been identified.
The Committee further directs the report to include:
1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial
phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or
held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including
data and intelligence reporting held by the
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data
collected by:
a. geospatial intelligence;
b. signals intelligence;
c. human intelligence; and
d. measurement and signals intelligence;
3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was
derived from investigations of intrusions of
unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted
United States airspace;
4. A detailed description of an interagency process
for ensuring timely data collection and centralized
analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting
for the Federal Government, regardless of which service
or agency acquired the information;
5. Identification of an official accountable for the
process described in paragraph 4;
6. Identification of potential aerospace or other
threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to
national security, and an assessment of whether this
unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be
attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that
indicate a potential adversary may have achieved
breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put
United States strategic or conventional forces at risk;
and
8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of
data, enhanced research and development, and additional
funding and other resources.
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
Coordination of Security for Domestic Military Installations and Other
Facilities
The Committee is concerned that, as a result of several
recent incidents of attempted unauthorized access to Naval Air
Station Key West and Fort Story, Virginia by Chinese nationals,
several security vulnerabilities have been discovered. Foreign
adversaries may be systematically probing military
installations and facilities, and it is important that the
Department of Defense take responsibility for ensuring security
measures are adequate, unauthorized accesses are tracked, and
uniform reporting requirements for attempted unauthorized
accesses are established.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the FBI, to
establish within the Office of the USD(I&S) a designee
responsible for coordination of security for domestic military
installations and other domestic military facilities.
Specifically, the designee's responsibilities shall include
tracking unauthorized incursions into domestic military
installations and facilities and attempts at such incursions.
The Committee further directs that, within 180 days of
enactment of this Act, such individual shall develop a strategy
for security and counterintelligence collection that defines
the capability requirements, responsibilities, and processes
for security and counterintelligence for domestic military
installations and other domestic military facilities. In
addition, not less frequently than once each year, the Under
Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of other
appropriate elements of the DoD and the IC, brief the
intelligence and armed services committees on the:
1. Activities of the designee; and
2. Current and anticipated trends and developments in
connection with security for domestic military
installations and other domestic military facilities.
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Modernization and
Integration Efforts of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-functional
Team of the Department of Defense
The Committee is concerned with the intelligence silos that
have resulted from isolated procurement programs that store
data in individual repositories, each with its own set of
cataloging procedures and proprietary technologies. This, in
turn, potentially limits advantageous communications among
databases, causes vital intelligence to go undetected, and
causes duplication of separately-located analysts' efforts in
reviewing other, less vital, intelligence information.
Therefore, the Committee directs the head of the
Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, as established in
the Department of Defense by memorandum dated April 26, 2017,
to submit to the congressional intelligence and armed services
committees within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report
that includes:
1. Recommendations for the delineation of efforts
between the Team and the Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center, especially with respect to data labeling,
testing and evaluation;
2. Recommendations for resource sharing across the
intelligence community for test and evaluation as
Project Maven transitions its independent lines of
effort;
3. The plan of the Team to integrate unsupervised
artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g., algorithms
that learn from data without being trained, allowing
the artificial intelligence to self-improve) into
Project Maven;
4. The plan of the Team to incorporate independent
data repositories located across the intelligence
community, irrespective of the element providing the
data or the domain they are resident to, into Project
Maven; and
5. The plan of the Team to ensure that development of
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination technology
that will facilitate and enhance the capability of
analysts to rapidly search across near real-time
sensors, leverage historical data, and identify
valuable intelligence is incorporated into the Defense
Intelligence Agency Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-
repository System.
Plan for Assessing Government Agency Counterintelligence Programs
Adversary intelligence and security service efforts to
monitor, access, penetrate, and/or manipulate government
facilities, personnel, networks, and supply chains have become
increasingly more sophisticated, as described in the National
Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States. Many
national security agencies, to include those in the DoD and IC,
have mature and robust counterintelligence programs to preserve
the integrity of their systems. However, many agencies'
programs lag behind, either because they do not believe they
are at risk or because of internal funding challenges.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to develop a plan
within 90 days of enactment of this Act for assessing the
effectiveness of all government agency counterintelligence
programs. This plan should address the standards and methods of
assessment that may apply for different categories of executive
agencies; phasing of implementation over a five-year timeframe
to cover all government counterintelligence; the periodicity
for updated assessments; and annual costs to conduct these
assessment and any recommendation for a cost recovery
mechanism.
Security Clearance Procedures and Rights to Appeal
Section 401 of the Act provides appeal rights and
procedures for security clearance eligibility determinations.
This provision is not intended to impede agency decisions
regarding access to classified information for a limited
purpose or duration (e.g., regarding an election or one-time
read-ins for a specific event or threat). The Committee does,
however, expect agencies to keep Congress fully and currently
informed of any limited purpose or duration grants of access.
Finally, the Committee expects the DNI-level appeals panel to
exercise judgment and review only those appeals that the panel
concludes have evidentiary and jurisdictional merit.
Supporting Industry during Coronavirus
Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES Act) in March 2020 to provide necessary
assistance to the American economy during the coronavirus
pandemic. An important element of that Act was Section 3610,
which provided agencies authorities to modify contracts for
companies supporting the government. This provision was
critical to the defense industrial base. The Committee believes
that consistent interpretation of Section 3610, particularly as
it relates to work conducted at contractor facilities, cost
reimbursement methodology, adjustments in payment plans, and
adjustments in contract periods of performance, is essential to
reducing uncertainty and sustaining a vibrant national security
sector. The Committee looks forward to working with the IC
elements in identifying if any additional authorities or
resources are necessary and identifying lessons learned for any
future national emergency.
Efficient Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
The Committee is concerned that there are unnecessary
challenges to the utilization of Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF) spaces by multiple programs among
IC and Department of Defense components and their appropriately
cleared government contractors. These challenges result in
inefficient use of SCIFs and classified networks. The Committee
finds that it is important to support collaboration and related
efficiencies by sharing SCIF spaces.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to issue, within 180 days after
enactment of this Act, revised guidance authorizing and
directing government agencies and their appropriately cleared
contractors to process, store, use, and discuss sensitive
compartmented information (SCI) at facilities previously
approved to handle SCI, without need for further approval by
agency or by site. This guidance shall apply to both IC-
controlled access programs and DoD special access programs.
Committee Action
On June 3, 2020, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the
following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Acting
Chairman and Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified
annex for Fiscal Year 2021, the base text for purposes of
amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc three
amendments to the classified annex, as follows: (1) a second-
degree amendment by Acting Chairman Rubio; (2) an amendment by
Acting Chairman Rubio; and (3) a second-degree amendment by
Senator Sasse.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc five
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator
Burr and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to improve
provisions relating to the IC Information Technology
Environment; (2) an amendment by Senator Risch and cosponsored
by Senator King, to require reporting on Cyberspace Solarium
Commission recommendations; (3) a second-degree amendment by
Acting Chairman Rubio and cosponsored by Senators Risch, Blunt,
Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse, to improve Section 322; (4) an
amendment by Senator Bennet and cosponsored by Vice Chairman
Warner and Senators Cotton and Cornyn, to require an assessment
of critical technology trends related to artificial
intelligence; and (5) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require
a report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear
nonproliferation.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by
Senator Burr and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, which
provides the legal authorities required for the Director of the
CIA to improve recruitment in the areas of science, technology,
engineering, arts, and mathematics (known as STEAM) necessary
to meet long-term national security needs.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner and cosponsored by Senators
Collins and Bennet, to an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner,
and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Bennet, that requires
Federal presidential campaigns to report to the FBI illegal
offers of assistance by known foreign agents. The second-degree
amendment exempted unpaid volunteers from such reporting
requirements and reduced the criminal penalties. By a vote of 8
ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted the amendment by Vice
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and
Bennet, as modified by the second-degree amendment. The votes
in person were as follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--no; Senator
Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Blunt--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator
Sasse--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye;
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;
Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--aye.
By a vote of 7 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Senator Wyden to establish the DNI as the
Executive Agent for Federal government-wide declassification
processes and requirements. The votes in person were as
follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Burr--no; Senator
Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; Senator
Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Sasse--no; Vice
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Harris--
aye; and Senator Bennet--aye.
Votes to report the committee bill
On June 3, 2020, the Committee voted to report the bill, as
amended, by a vote of 14 ayes and one no. The votes in person
or by proxy were as follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--aye;
Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye;
Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;
Senator Sasse--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--aye;
Senator King--aye; Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--
aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 8,
2020, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
Despite its strong provisions, I voted against the Fiscal
Year 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act because the
legislation failed to reform a broken, costly declassification
system. Years of reports, from the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Public Interest
Declassification Board (PIDB), have documented how a flood of
digital classification has overwhelmed the federal government's
obsolete declassification system. There is a consensus, inside
and outside government, that the system is unsustainable.
The ISOO has determined that the cost of classification
continues to increase and now exceeds $18 billion annually. A
dysfunctional system that lets more and more classified records
pile up wastes a significant portion of that amount, while
undermining transparency and doing nothing to protect national
security.
There is no dispute about the severity of the problem, nor
about the solution--modernization of the declassification
system. Senator Jerry Moran and I have introduced bipartisan
legislation (S. 3733) to charge the Director of National
Intelligence with modernizing declassification, a
recommendation also made by the PIDB. I am disappointed that
the Committee rejected efforts to adopt this commonsense
bipartisan reform and address this ever-growing crisis.
The bill includes a number of important Intelligence
Community whistleblower protection provisions, four of which
were included at the behest of Vice Chairman Warner and myself.
Those provisions protect from outside interference the
Inspector General's determinations about what whistleblower
complaints to submit to Congress, prohibit the public
disclosure of whistleblowers' identities, prohibit
whistleblower complaints from being shared with the subjects of
those complaints, and provide a channel for whistleblowers to
come directly to Congress without interference from the DNI.
Unnecessarily restrictive language was added to the
provision facilitating direct whistleblower communications with
Congress. The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection
Act created a process for whistleblowers to communicate with
the ``intelligence committees,'' whereas the bill appears to
limit such communication to the Chairman and Vice Chairman, or
certain nonpartisan staff. To the extent the bill creates new
limitations on efforts by whistleblowers to convey concerns to
members of Congress, the language in the bill should be
modified or clarified.
The bill includes a fifth whistleblower provision I
proposed that protects whistleblowers whose security clearances
are revoked or who face an adverse access determination by
requiring that the government demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the agency would have made the same
security clearance or access determination in the absence of
the whistleblower's disclosure.
It also includes my provision requiring a report on the
threat posed by the proliferation of commercial spyware as well
as U.S. government efforts to counter that threat.
Finally, I am pleased that the Classified Annex requires a
report with information that Senator Heinrich and I have been
seeking related to collection conducted pursuant to Executive
Order 12333.
Ron Wyden.
[all]
211 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Phone: (202) 224-1700
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